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Abstract: Sunday shop opening is deregulated to the municipal level in the
Netherlands. Despite positive eﬀects on economic growth and employment, many
municipalities restrict Sunday shop opening. Based on 2003 data we show that
diverse local characteristics, like the size of municipalities and religious and po-
litical aﬃliation, play a major role in decisions about Sunday shop opening. The
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that municipal control over Sunday
shopping hours results in a considerable variation in policies. As this variation is
related to signiﬁcant diﬀerences between municipalities, reasons exist to decen-
tralize the decision on Sunday shopping opening.
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I Introduction
In the last years European countries regularly debate about relaxing shop
opening hours legislation. As an outcome of this debate some legal restrictions
have been relaxed for example in Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany. Since
1972 in Sweden opening hours are unrestricted for all stores. Until June 1996
Dutch shops were not allowed to be open on evenings and on Sundays, today
shops can be open from 6 to 22 hours and Sunday trading can be allowed 12
times a year (and on all Sundays in tourist regions). In Germany liberalization
was decided in November 1996 changing closing time on weekdays from 18.30 to
20.00 and on Saturday from 14.00 to 16.00 hours.
From an economic point of view strong arguments exist for a less tight
regulation of shop opening hours. The fast growing empirical literature about
this issue stresses unequivocally out more employment and welfare gains for
consumers. Burda (2000) and Gradus (1996) show that many European
countries consider deregulation relevant for the policy debate concerning
unemployment and job creation.
The economic literature points to substantial positive employment eﬀects of
longer opening hours, mainly due to an increase of threshold labour but
possibly also as the result of increased sales as in Goos (2005), Gradus (1996)
and Skuterud (2005). Moreover, liberalization results in markedly relaxed time
constraints for consumers. The eﬀect on prices is more doubtful. According to
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Nooteboom (1983) and CPB (1995) average prices may increase or decrease,
dependent on the sum of higher costs due to increased threshold labour. On the
other hand, Thurik (1984) reasons that an increase in productivity as a result of
higher capital utilization may induce lower costs. Tanguay et al. (1995)
suggests on the basis of evidence from the 1990 liberalization in Quebec that
mark-ups may increase and that prices rise. However, this evidence is rather
weak as it is based on short term eﬀects only. The evidence from Sweden and
the US suggests that prices fell (Burda and Weil, 2001).
Despite these positive economic eﬀects most European countries still restrict
opening on Sundays. In Germany, Norway and Switzerland opening is
prohibited. Only in some countries, such as Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the
United Kingdom, there are (nearly) no legal restrictions. In Denmark and
Finland restrictions apply only for large stores. These countries all have
national regulation. In a few other countries, Belgium, Italy, Spain and the
Netherlands, the decision is deregulated to the municipal or regional level.1
One reason for the high occurrence of restrictive Sunday opening laws might be
that in the decision process not only eﬀects on economic growth and
employment play an important role, but also religious and social aspects. This
is a general ﬁnding in the literature. Hersch et al. (2004), for instance,
demonstrate that smoking regulation is the outcome of a complex interaction
between economic arguments, interest group behavior and social preferences.
Burda and Weil (2001) show that restrictions on Sunday trading are important
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if external eﬀects of ruinous competition exist. In some European countries the
regulation of Sunday shop opening hours is intended to reserve the Sunday as
religious day for going to the church or pause day to rest. The restrictions in
some US states on Sunday trading seem to have a religious background as well.
Moreover, trade unions have supported restrictive policies from a social
perspective.
Therefore, the decision process in most countries reﬂects an interesting
trade-oﬀ. If markets value externalities like social implications and religious
values improperly, regulation internalises these externalities. On the other hand
this regulation reduces consumer choice and employment. Whether beneﬁts are
higher than costs, may depend on local circumstances. An important question
is, therefore, which jurisdiction should make such a trade-oﬀ. Oates (1969)
proves that welfare increases when the trade-oﬀ does take place at the level
where externalities are valued homogenously. This means in our case that an
important question is whether municipalities diﬀer with respect to the values
attached to Sunday shop opening externalities. If this is the case, the municipal
level seems to be the appropriate jurisdiction from an economic point of view.
The empirical literature presents only two studies that evaluate some of the
reasons for liberal or restrictive shopping laws. Price and Yandle (1987) discuss
for 25 US states the Sunday closing laws in 1970 and 1984. In 1970 they found
evidence for a number of explaining variables for restrictive opening policies,
including religious aﬃliation, political inﬂuence and the participation of women
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in the labour force. However, the 1984 results oﬀer much less explanatory
power. Ferris (1991) presents evidence for 45 Ontario cities. From the data it
follows that higher female labour participation will decrease the probability of
choosing early closing hours and that cities with a greater population density
have more liberal laws. In this article weak evidence is found for religious
aﬃliation, mostly because of data problems.
Therefore, the evidence on the reasons for Sunday opening laws are not very
clear. The Dutch policy, deregulation of the decision on Sunday shop opening
to the municipal level, provides a natural experiment that makes it possible to
increase this evidence. Based on 2003 data for all (489) Dutch municipalities we
analyse the determinants for diﬀerences in local shop opening regimes. We show
that variation between municipalities depends on diﬀerences in interests of shop
owners, social demand, ideology and regional circumstances. This indicates that
the municipal level seems to be the appropriate jurisdiction to decide on shop
opening from an economic point of view.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
methodology and section III describes the data. Section IV presents the
estimation results. Section V gives some robustness tests and section VI
concludes.
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II Methodology
The basis for our analysis is the explanation of the decision Dutch municipalities
made regarding the opening of shops on Sundays. As endogenous variable we
have a variable (SOi) describing the Sunday shop policy of municipality i. The
main diﬀerence between municipalities is whether they allow Sunday openings
or not. Therefore, our ﬁrst speciﬁcation is a binary probit model.2 In this model
SOi is zero for municipalities that do not allow open shops on any Sunday and
one for municipalities with open shops on some Sundays. As an alternative we
estimate an ordered probit model which measures the extent of shop opening
days on Sundays. In this model SOi takes the value one for municipalities which
do not allow open shops on Sunday, ten for municipalities which allow open
shops on all Sundays and values within one and ten for municipalities that allow
open shops on some Sundays. In this last case the actual value depends on the
number of Sundays for which shops are open (see section III and Appendix A).
The reasons for the diﬀerences in local Sunday shop policies are analysed by
regressing SOi on a number of municipal characteristics. These characteristics
are based on four theories, regarding the interests of shop owners, social
demand, ideology and regional diﬀerences.
The ﬁrst theory is based on the interests of shop owners. Some shop owners
will advocate that shop opening on Sundays raise the attractiveness of
shopping, especially in shopping centres with a richer diversity of shops or more
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specialized shops. People are more interested to shop in municipalities with a
large number of shops. Thus, we include the number of shops per 1000
inhabitants (SNi) to test whether municipalities with larger shopping
possibilities have a more liberal Sunday shopping policy.
At the other side, especially small shop owners often experience diﬃculties
when they expand opening hours due to the need to employ a certain
‘threshold’ labour at all times as in Nooteboom (1983). More restrictive
regulation of opening hours tends to favour small stores. Furthermore,
liberalizing shop opening hours regulation has the eﬀect of lowering access cost
and, according to Morrison and Newman (1983), the sales of large stores will
increase. There is some evidence that local politicians often react to this
unequal competition between small and large shops. This reaction will of course
depend on the presence of small shops versus large shops. Therefore, we include
the average number of employees per shop for each municipality (SSi).
Moreover, excessive shop opening hours in surrounding municipalities might
generate competitive pressure. If customers can shop in surrounding
municipalities, turnover turnover will diminish in municipalities with closed
shops on Sunday. Ferris (1991) argues that retailers view shop hours as an
eﬀective instrument to appropriate customers from rivals. Kay and Morris
(1987) show that competitive pressure may induce excessive opening at times
when high costs would be incurred. We test this theory by including an impact
factor measuring the extent of shop opening days in surrounding municipalities.
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This impact factor is calculated using the following equation:
ENi =
∑
j
SOj (II.1)
where ENi is the impact factor of municipality i, i is a vector of all
municipalities, j is a vector of the municipalities with a liberal shop opening
policy in the neighbourhood of municipality i.3
The second theory is based on the social demand for shop opening on
Sundays. Jacobsen and Kooreman (2004) prove that the time spent on
shopping on Sundays has increased signiﬁcantly since the liberalization of
Dutch opening hours. Thum and Weichenrieder (1997) argue that the
possibilities to shop during the week will be less for couples that work both.
They will value unrestricted shopping hours higher than single income families
due to higher real (opportunity) cost of time during weekdays. We include the
incidence of household with a double income (HDi) to test this theory.
A second household characteristic that might inﬂuence social demand for shop
opening on Sundays is the size of the household. According to Eurostat (2003)
parents of large households spent more time at home. We include the number of
inhabitants per household (HSi) to test whether large households value a more
liberal policy higher.
Ferris (1991) argues that diﬀerences in population density across municipalities
may inﬂuence the relative demand for Sunday opening. Customers in low
7
population density areas will value distance higher than longer shopping times,
increasing the possibilities for small shop owners to resist opening on Sundays.
To test this theory, population density (DEi) is included as well.
The third theory is based on the ideological colour of the municipality.
Posner (1974) made already clear that that voter ideology might inﬂuence the
decision on shop opening hours. The Sunday opening decision of a municipality
depends on voters’ convictions. In the Netherlands orthodox protestant parties
(SGP and CU) are strictly against Sunday shop opening.4 The larger Christian
democratic party CDA is less strict as it accepts compromises far more easily.
Based on the belief that the Sunday has a special Christian function local
politicians of SGP, CU and (sometimes) CDA often try to keep the shops closed
at Sundays. Other parties try to achieve the same goal from a social point of
view. Left-wing parties like the SP (Socialist Party) and PvdA (Social
Democrats) sometimes play together with Christian parties to reach a majority
in the local political arena. Liberal parties like VVD (Conservative Liberals)
and D66 (Left-wing Liberals) see Sunday shop opening as a good opportunity
to enlarge the possibilities to shop and to stimulate the local economy. Because
the Sunday opening decision is taken in the municipality council, the power of
local political parties depends on the relative number of aldermen (ALi,p).
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However, the policy outcome does not only depend on the direct balance of
power in the municipality council, but also on the inﬂuence of church members
on the political parties. Although church and state are separated in the
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Netherlands, local church members often try to inﬂuence the policy debate.
Therefore, municipalities with more active church members may show more
restrictive Sunday policies.6 To test this eﬀect we include the percentage of
inhabitants that are active church members (CHi).
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As large cities in the Netherlands are ethnically heterogeneous societies with a
diverse attitude towards Sundays, they will put more emphasis on a liberal
policy. Moreover, as shopping on Sundays is used as a form of entertainment,
larger municipalities have a better infrastructure for ‘fun-shopping’. Ferris
(1991), on the other hand, argues that a rise in the number of inhabitants
diminishes the number of open Sundays. In this view, free-rider problems
increase with the number of individuals due to coordination cost. To test the
eﬀect of municipality size we include the number of inhabitants (INi).
Furthermore, to check for non-linearity the number of inhabitants squared is
included as well.
The fourth theory is based on regional diﬀerences. Gradus (2001) ﬁnds some
evidence that especially the provinces bordering Belgium (Brabant, Zeeland and
Limburg) with their more Burgundian tradition have a more liberal Sunday
shop policy. Another reason is the diﬀerence in excises between Belgium and
the Netherlands.8 For example, according to Cnossen (2002) the excise on
unleaded gasoline is 20% higher in the Netherlands. Furthermore, Sunday
opening is allowed in Belgium for special stores as bakeries and furniture stores
as well as for other stores in tourist municipalities, one can argue that
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cross-border shopping will speed up Sunday opening in these regions. Ferris
(2000) proves that intense cross border shopping between the US and Canada
was a major stimulus to deregulate the closing law in Ontario. This theory is
tested by including a dummy for the provinces (REi,k) where Groningen is
excluded as numeraire.
Table 1 summarizes the priors about the inﬂuence of variables representing the
four theories on the probability of a less restrictive Sunday opening policy (see
Appendix A for the exact deﬁnition of variables).
[Insert Table 1 here]
III Data
Data for 282 Dutch municipalities on the incidence of shop opening on Sundays
(SOi) come from a website which gives information for the situation in 2003
(www.koopzondag.com). Data for the other 207 municipalities are gathered
using website information of these municipalities, the results of an enquiry and
direct contact with municipal representatives. We ﬁnally have data for all
municipalities. There are no data available for years before 2003.
Table 2 shows how many municipalities allow for open shops on Sunday.9 Of all
municipalities 32% have always closed shops on Sundays. The other extreme,
all Sundays open shops, is allowed in 4% of the municipalities. In 66% of the
municipalities Sunday opening is allowed in the range of only special Sundays
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like Boxing day (which is called second Christmas day in the Netherlands) to all
Sundays.10
[Insert Table 2 here]
Data for the impact factor of neighbouring municipalities (ENi) follow from the
information on SOi and the average distance between municipalities. Data for
the other explaining variables are for 2003 and from the CBS (the Dutch
Central Bureau for Statistics).11 The variables are summarized in Table 3 (see
Appendix A for a description of the variables).
[Insert Table 3 here]
IV Results
Table 4 presents the estimations results. The Andrews test statistic for
goodness of ﬁt of the binary probit model is signiﬁcant at 99%. The
expectation-prediction table shows that the increase in correct predictions
compared with the constant probability predictions is large for both values of
SOi: respectively 42% and 43%. Both results indicate that the discussed
theories do indeed explain a signiﬁcant part of the variation between
municipalities.
[Insert Table 4 here]
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The theory regarding interests of shop owners explains part of the
diﬀerences in shop policies. Municipalities with a larger number of shops have a
higher probability of a more liberal Sunday policy. The coeﬃcient for the
number of shops is signiﬁcant and positive in both the binary and ordered
probit. In the binary probit competitive pressure of neighbouring municipalities
results in a lower probability of closed shops on all Sundays. In the ordered
probit estimation this relation is not found. Apparently, the competitive
pressure seems to have more inﬂuence in the decision to allow open shops or not
and less in the decision how much Sundays shops may open their doors.
Estimations with other values for the maximum distance deﬁning neighbouring
municipalities (10, 15 or 50 kilometres) show that for the binary probit
estimations this variable is not always signiﬁcant either. Thus, we conclude that
there is only weak evidence for the inﬂuence of competitive pressure. The
results for interests of small shop owners, i.e. size of shops, are more robust and
in accordance with the 1970 results presented by Price and Yandle (1987). Both
estimations show a signiﬁcant and positive relation between the average number
of employees per shop and the number of open Sundays.
The results for the household size and the number of households with double
income show that diﬀerences in social demand explain part of the variation in
shop policies. Municipalities with larger families and less households with a
double income have a higher probability to have more restrictive Sunday
policies. This is similar to Ferris (1991) and Price and Yandle (1987), where
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higher female participation stimulates Sunday opening. This result is also in
accordance with the theoretical result by Thum (1997). The population density
variable is not signiﬁcant suggesting that Sunday opening is not more likely in a
sparsely inhabited area. This result is contrary to Ferris (1991). A possible
explanation is that the variation in the Netherlands is far less pronounced than
in Canada.
The results for ideology are quite clear and stronger compared with Ferris
(1991) and Price and Yandle (1987). Municipalities with more orthodox
protestant (SGP and CU) aldermen show a much larger probability to have
conservative policies.12 Interestingly, the CDA-variable is insigniﬁcant.
Although the Christian Democratic Party has a historical foundation in
Christian religion, the inﬂuence on Sunday shop opening is apparently not
present. Evidence exist that some non-Christian parties might also stimulate a
restrictive policy. The variables for PvdA (in the binary estimation) and for SP
(in the ordered probit) show that social considerations might play a decisive
role in the policy debate.13 The liberal philosophy of D66 cannot explain the
signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient for this party. However, there is no signiﬁcance in
the ordered probit. The second variable measuring the inﬂuence of ideology, the
incidence of active church members, is signiﬁcant in both estimations.
Municipalities with more active church member citizens have more stringent
Sunday policies. 14
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The coeﬃcient of inhabitants squared in the binary probit estimation makes
clear that the positive eﬀect of the number of customers diminishes. As the
cultural diversity of large cities is much larger than for small municipalities, a
threshold eﬀect can be assumed in the choice between zero or some open
Sundays.15 At ﬁrst sight this result is contrary to that of Ferris (1991). Based
on data for 45 large and medium-sized cities in Ontario he ﬁnds a positive but
insigniﬁcant relationship between size and Sunday opening. Our results
indicate, however, that size does only matter if small and large municipalities
are included. Therefore, our results may in fact be in accordance with those
found by Ferris (1991). Indeed, if we exclude the 75 municipalities which have
less than 9,500 inhabitants the coeﬃcient for inhabitants squared is no longer
signiﬁcant. This intuition corresponds with the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient of the
squared variable in the ordered probit estimation.
The data show some evidence for the regional diﬀerences argument. In the
ordered probit the coeﬃcients for the provinces Brabant, Zeeland, Limburg and
Overijssel are signiﬁcant at 95%, while the coeﬃcients for Limburg and Zeeland
are signiﬁcant at 90% in the ordered probit. These regressions imply that there
is some evidence that cross-border shopping is an important element for the
opening hour’s policy in municipalities especially adjacent to Belgium. This is
in accordance with Ferris (2000) who found that after a period of intensive cross
border shopping (due to a Canadian/US exchange rate that favoured US
shopping), competition was a major stimulus in liberalizing Sunday shopping in
Ontario. 14
An interesting question is whether the estimation results give information about
the relative weight of the variables. Calculation of the change in probabilities
for the binary SOi if the variables representing the theories are varied by one
standard deviation reveals that ideology and regional culture play a larger role
than the other theories. Especially the number of inhabitants, the presence of
SGP, CU and D66-aldermen, the number of active church members and the
regional culture inﬂuence the Sunday policy (see Table 5).16 For example, if the
number of inhabitants increases with one standard deviation, the probability
that a municipality allows Sunday opening increases with 22%. Moreover, if the
number of active church members increases from 13 to 18 per 100 inhabitants
the probability decreases with 16%.
[Insert Table 5 here]
V Robustness
As multicollinearity may play a role we estimate also speciﬁcations excluding
some of the variables to analyse whether standard errors are inﬂuenced. These
estimations give no indication that multicollinearity inﬂuences our conclusions.
Furthermore, none of the correlations between explaining variables exceeds 0.5
in absolute values. Even for variables where collinearity could be expected, like
household size versus the percentage of active church members or population
density, correlations are rather low. Apparently our dataset is large enough to
15
make robust estimation of all included variables possible. Moreover, we tested
also for heteroskedasticity. The LM test statistic is 1.53 for the binary probit,
which is insigniﬁcant at all usual levels. Standard errors are therefore not
corrected for heteroskedasticity.
As an alternative to the presented ordered probit model with ten categories, we
estimate also a model with a less reﬁned speciﬁcation (ﬁve categories) of the
SOi variable to test for partial ordering. The results for this estimation are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the reﬁned version.
Some remarks are necessary about the endogeneity of the explaining variables.
First, it is, for example, possible that the open shop policies are not only
inﬂuenced by the number of shops (SN) or the size of shops (SS), but that these
variables depend also on the shop policies itself. This is for instance the case if
relaxation of shop policies stimulates economic development. To test this, we
estimate a system of equations for SO, SN and SS (using Full Information
Maximum Likelihood) to analyse whether shop policies inﬂuence SN and SS.
Both coeﬃcients for SO in the SN and SS speciﬁcation, however, are
insigniﬁcant.17
Second, as the explaining variables refer to 2003, one could argue that some of
them are not exogenous. To test for endogeneity problems we estimate with
1996 data for the variables where endogeneity might be present (SN, SS, HS,
HD, DE and IN).18 On the basis of a Wald-test, most coeﬃcients are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from our initial model (compare Table 4 and 6). However,
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household size (HS) is no longer signiﬁcant in the binary estimation of the new
model, while it is only signiﬁcant at 10% in the ordered probit estimation.
Nevertheless, HS is not a variable where endogeneity might be expected.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Furthermore, the impact factor for surrounding municipalities (EN) is no longer
signiﬁcant in the binary estimation. As it was already insigniﬁcant in the
ordered probit, the conclusion is that the proof for the eﬀect of surrounding
shop policies is very weak. This could result from an endogeneity problem. In
our estimations the variable that measures the impact of surrounding
municipalities is treated exogenously (see equation II.1). If this variable is in
fact jointly determined, the strategic behaviour of municipalities should be
taken into account. The appropriate methodology would be to use spatial
econometric techniques. The literature provides robust measures to test for
spatial autocorrelation. Bivand and Szymanski (2000) for instance use Moran’s
I to show that for the UK spatial autocorrelation was present in the waste
collection market before the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering.
In our case Moran’s I measures the correlation of the Sunday shop policy of
municipalities with the policies of neighbours. Moran’s I lies between -1 and 1.
If Moran’s I is zero no spatial autocorrelation is present.
Using software described in Ferstl (2004) we calculate Moran’s I for diﬀerent
weighing schemes.19 Table 7 summarizes the results. Nearly all Moran’s I’s are
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insigniﬁcant. Only for large distances a signiﬁcant result is found. However, in
these cases Moran’s I is very small and even negative. We conclude that spatial
autocorrelation is not present.
[Insert Table 7 here]
VI Conclusions
Since 1996 the decision on Sunday shop opening is deregulated to the municipal
level. They may allow for 12 open Sundays per year or even open shops on all
Sundays when they are in a tourist region. Still, 32% of the Dutch
municipalities shops are closed on every Sunday in 2003. Drawing on various
theoretical arguments, two statistical (binary and ordered probit) models were
estimated to explain the occurrence of restrictive Sunday opening. It is shown
that especially the number of inhabitants, political aﬃliation, religious
aﬃliation and regional diﬀerences are important to explain the variation
between municipalities. The number and size of shops and household
characteristics are signiﬁcant as well, although their inﬂuence is smaller. There
is very weak evidence for excessive competition with neighbouring
municipalities, while cross-border shopping may play a role.
The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that municipal control over
Sunday shopping hours results in a considerable variation in policies. As this
variation is related to signiﬁcant diﬀerences between municipalities,
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deregulation to the local level allows municipalities to take account of local
characteristics. Clearly, reasons exist to decentralize the decision on Sunday
shopping opening from an economic point of view.
In this paper we only investigate the policy decision by the municipality. Less
restrictive policies do not necessarily imply that all shops are in fact open at
Sundays. There is some evidence that especially food and furniture stores make
use of a more liberal policy. In large cities also shopping centres and special
stores are open. Future research might generate more insight in the opening
decision of show owners when data are available about the opening hours of
individual shops.
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Notes
1This information is based on OECD (1997) and an update using website
information of the responsible authorities in diﬀerent countries.
2As an alternative we estimate also a logit model. All results are very similar.
3Neighbourhood municipalities are deﬁned as those municipalities that are
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no further away than 25 kilometres (17 miles). Alternative assumptions with
diﬀerent maximum distances are also tested. See section IV.
4On a national scale these parties are small (each about 2% of total votes).
However, the inﬂuence of these parties is large for some municipalities as the
voters are regionally concentrated.
5Mayor and aldermen form the executive board. The mayor, whose executive
power is limited, is appointed by the central government. The aldermen are
elected by the municipal council. As a result of the proportional representation
system only in a small minority of the municipalities one of the parties (most
times CDA or PvdA) has a majority in the municipal council. In general, a
coalition of parties has to be formed that governs the municipality for four years.
Each coalition party has one or more aldermen, based on the size of the parties.
The total number of aldermen depends on the number of inhabitants. As long
as the coalition is stable, policies proposed by the aldermen will in general be
accepted by the council.
6A diﬀerent interpretation of the church attendance variable is that when the
number of people going to church increases, the market size of Sunday shoppers
decreases. This means that shop owners will have fewer incentives to open their
shop on Sundays.
7In the Netherlands a large part of church members never attends church
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services. The included variable is related to members that attend church services
at least once per week. The literature about the relation between religion and
economics regularly ﬁnds diﬀerent eﬀects of religion and its intensity as in Barro
and McCleary (2003). In our case variables representing church membership are
not signiﬁcant.
8In both countries excises and value-added taxes are set on a national level.
9The categories two till ﬁve presented in Table 2 are further divided in two
subcategories in the ordered probit model, based on an opening regime for part
of or the whole municipality (see Appendix A).
10Note that we use the term Sundays also for days like Easter Monday. Tra-
ditionally shops were not open on Sundays and special days like Easter Monday,
Whit Monday and Boxing Day. Currently, most municipalities may open shops
on 12 Sundays and special days, except for Christmas day, Easter Sunday and
Whit Sunday. Municipalities in tourist regions may open shops on all Sundays.
11All variables are available per municipality, except for the active church mem-
ber variable. This variable is available for 42 regions. In section VI we discuss
the use of explaining variables from the same year as for SOi.
12Note that the coeﬃcients for SGP and CU are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each
other in the ordered probit, but not in the binary case. This is not surprizing as
the SGP is the most conservative protestant party.
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13Note that the coeﬃcient for PvdA does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the coef-
ﬁcients of SGP and CU in the binary case. However, the coeﬃcients of SGP and
SP do diﬀer in the ordered probit case.
14Interestingly, variables representing the incidence of church members that
are less active (in terms of the number of times they attend services) are not
signiﬁcant. Results are available upon request.
15According to our estimates the impact of size diminishes even when munici-
palities have more than 410,0000 inhabitants. However, as only three municipal-
ities have this size, this decrease is in fact an out of sample result. A Wald-test
of the ﬁrst derivative with respect to municipality size shows that the size eﬀect
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (at 99%) indeed.
16These ﬁgures are calculated using the average for all variables and varying
signiﬁcant variables with one standard deviation.
17These estimation results are available upon request.
18We do not have data before 1996. However, it is not reasonable to assume
that already in 1996 signiﬁcant eﬀects result from changes in Sunday shop opening
in the second part of 1996 as all variables require considerable time to change.
Note furthermore that we do not use the results with the 1996 data in the former
paragraph as we have less data for 1996 (448 instead of 489).
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19We start by including all municipalities with open shops on Sundays and
calculate the weights as the inverse of the distance between municipalities. In
alternative analyses we set the weight for municipalities with open shops on Sun-
days at a larger distance than respectively 50, 37.5, 25, 15, 10 and 7.5 kilometres
at zero.
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Tables
Table 1: Variables representing the theories
Theory Representing variable p(SOi)
a
Interests shop owners Number of shops (SN) Positive
Size of shops (SS) Positive
Policy surrounding municip. (EN) Positive
Social demand Size of households (HS) Negative
Double income households (HD) Positive
Population density (DE) Positive
Ideological colour Aldermen (AL) Varying
Active church members (CH) Negative
Inhabitants (IN) Positive
Regional diﬀerences Provinces (RE) Varying
a. Probability of less restrictive Sunday opening policy.
Table 2: Sunday opening in Dutch municipalities
Sunday policy (SO) Municipalities % of total
1. Zero Sundays open 155 32
2. Only special days (max 5) like Boxing day 18 4
3. Less than 12 Sundays per year 129 26
4. 12 Sundays per year 96 20
5. more than 12, less than all per year 70 14
6. all Sundays per year 21 4
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Average Max Min St.dev.
Number of shops per 1000 inhabitants (SN) 6 18 0 2
Size of shops in employees per shop (SS) 5 15 2 2
Impact factor surrounding municip. (EN) 11 32 0 8
Size of households (HS) 2.5 3.6 1.8 0.2
Double income households per 100 inh. (HD) 16 21 10 2
Population density (DE) 5 255 0 16
Aldermen as % of total aldermen (AL)
- SGP 2 50 0 8
- CU 3 50 0 9
- CDA 30 100 0 18
- SP 1 60 0 5
- PvdA 17 67 0 18
- GL 2 50 0 7
- VVD 16 67 0 18
- D66 2 33 0 6
Active church members as % of inh. (CH) 13 28 5 5
Inhabitants (IN) 33114 736562 1000 55660
Province (RE)
- Groningen 5 100 0 22
- Friesland 6 100 0 24
- Drenthe 2 100 0 15
- Overijssel 5 100 0 22
- Flevoland 1 100 0 11
- Gelderland 15 100 0 35
- Utrecht 7 100 0 25
- Noord-Holland 13 100 0 34
- Zuid-Holland 19 100 0 39
- Zeeland 3 100 0 16
- Noord-Brabant 14 100 0 35
- Limburg 10 100 0 30
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Table 4: Estimation results Sunday opening
Binary probit Ordered probit
Number of shops (SN) 1.52 ∗∗∗ (0.46) 1.27 ∗∗∗ (0.34)
Size of shops (SS) 0.14 ∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.06 ∗ (0.03)
Impact factor surrounding municip. (EN) 0.01 ∗ (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)
Household size (HS) -0.97 ∗∗ (0.41) -1.07 ∗∗∗ (0.41)
Households with double income (HD) 0.12 ∗∗ (0.05) 0.09 ∗∗ (0.04)
Population density (DE) -1.63 (4.48) 2.83 (3.44)
Alderman (AL):
- SGP -4.29 ∗∗∗ (1.54) -5.91 ∗∗∗ (1.42)
- CU -1.95 ∗∗ (0.91) -1.79 ∗∗ (0.75)
- CDA -0.30 (0.47) -0.03 (0.30)
- SP -2.48 (2.06) -1.94 ∗ (1.04)
- PvdA -0.70 ∗ (0.44) -0.42 (0.32)
- GL 1.49 (1.22) -1.11 (0.74)
- VVD -0.13 (0.45) -0.22 (0.31)
- D66 -2.56 ∗∗ (1.20) -0.98 (0.82)
Active church members (CH) -0.09 ∗∗∗ (0.03) -0.08 ∗∗∗ (0.02)
Inhabitants (IN) 2.79 ∗∗∗ (0.74) 0.94 ∗∗∗ (0.30)
Inhabitants squared (IN2) -0.34 ∗∗∗ (0.13) -0.05 (0.07)
Province (RE)
- Friesland 0.27 (0.42) 0.16 (0.34)
- Drenthe 0.17 (0.54) 0.26 (0.40)
- Overijssel 0.77 (0.50) 0.88 ∗∗ (0.36)
- Flevoland 0.46 (0.87) 0.91 ∗ (0.55)
- Gelderland 0.00 (0.39) 0.55 ∗ (0.30)
- Utrecht -0.63 (0.46) 0.12 (0.35)
- Noord-Holland -0.50 (0.43) 0.32 (0.32)
- Zuid-Holland -0.39 (0.43) 0.49 (0.32)
- Zeeland 1.19 ∗ (0.64) 2.48 ∗∗∗ (0.45)
- Noord-Brabant 0.76 (0.49) 0.79 ∗∗ (0.33)
- Limburg 0.90 ∗ (0.51) 1.17 ∗∗∗ (0.34)
Log likelihood -187.01 -833.95
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. All coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant
except for coeﬃcients with */**/;*** which denotes signiﬁcant at the 90/95/99%
level.
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Table 5: Eﬀect on probability of less restrictive Sunday policy
Theory Representing variable p(SOi)
a
Interests (small) shops Number of shops (SN) 0.08
Size of shops (SS) 0.08
Policy surrounding municip. (EN) 0.07
Social demand Size of households (HS) -0.07
Double income households (HD) 0.06
Population density (DE) -0.01
Ideological colour Aldermen (AL: SGP, CU and D66) -0.28
Active church members (CH) -0.16
Inhabitants (IN) 0.22
Regional diﬀerences Provinces (RE) 0.14
a. Probability of less restrictive Sunday opening policy.
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Table 6: Estimation results Sunday opening with 1996 data
Binary probit Ordered probit
Number of shops (SN96) 1.15 ∗∗ (0.45) 0.82 ∗∗ (0.32)
Size of shops (SS96) 0.14 ∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.09 ∗∗∗ (0.03)
Impact factor surrounding municip. (EN) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)
Household size (HS96) -0.38 (0.25) -0.69 ∗ (0.37)
Households with double income (HD96) 0.05 ∗∗ (0.02) 0.02 ∗∗ (0.01)
Population density (DE96) 0.43 (4.46) 3.90 (3.25)
Alderman (AL):
- SGP -5.08 ∗∗∗ (1.70) -6.65 ∗∗∗ (1.49)
- CU -2.53 ∗∗∗ (0.92) -2.11 ∗∗∗ (0.75)
- CDA -0.39 (0.49) -0.14 (0.32)
- SP -2.03 (2.17) -1.77 ∗ (1.04)
- PvdA -0.63 ∗ (0.45) -0.37 (0.33)
- GL 1.29 (1.21) -0.99 (0.75)
- VVD -0.23 (0.47) -0.28 (0.33)
- D66 -2.43 ∗∗ (1.22) -1.08 (0.84)
Active church members (CH) -0.09 ∗∗∗ (0.03) -0.08 ∗∗∗ (0.02)
Inhabitants (IN96) 3.44 ∗∗∗ (0.83) 0.92 ∗∗∗ (0.32)
Inhabitants squared (IN962) -0.44 ∗∗∗ (0.14) -0.05 (0.08)
Province (RE)
- Friesland 0.23 (0.42) 0.17 (0.34)
- Drenthe 7.31 (100.10) 0.60 (0.53)
- Overijssel 0.85 (0.54) 0.95 ∗∗ (0.38)
- Flevoland 0.47 (0.93) 0.97 ∗ (0.55)
- Gelderland -0.13 (0.39) 0.52 ∗ (0.30)
- Utrecht -0.65 (0.47) 0.19 (0.35)
- Noord-Holland -0.53 (0.44) 0.40 (0.33)
- Zuid-Holland -0.45 (0.44) 0.43 (0.33)
- Zeeland 1.52 ∗ (0.81) 2.71 ∗∗∗ (0.49)
- Noord-Brabant 0.69 (0.52) 0.85 ∗∗ (0.34)
- Limburg 0.84 ∗ (0.51) 1.28 ∗∗∗ (0.35)
Log likelihood -170.17 -766.70
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. All coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant
except for coeﬃcients with */**/;*** which denotes signiﬁcant at the 90/95/99%
level.
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Table 7: Moran’s I
Municipalities included Binary probit Ordered probit
All municipalities -0.023 (0.009)∗∗∗ -0.013 (0.009)
- within distance of 50 km -0.011 (0.002)∗∗∗ -0.009 (0.002)∗∗∗
- within distance of 37.5 km -0.017 (0.012) -0.013 (0.012)
- within distance of 25 km -0.018 (0.020) -0.010 (0.020)
- within distance of 15 km -0.046 (0.036) -0.014 (0.036)
- within distance of 10 km -0.060 (0.068) 0.054 (0.068)
- within distance of 7.5 km -0.046 (0.107) 0.145 (0.107)
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. All coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant
except for coeﬃcients with */**/;*** which denotes signiﬁcant at the 90/95/99%
level.
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Appendix A. List of variables
SO Sunday shop policy of municipality i
- binary Value = 0 for municipalities which allow no sunday opening
Value = 1 for municipalities which allow sunday opening
- ordered Municipalities which allow sunday opening:
- never: value = 1
- only on special days (like Easter Monday): value = 2
- less than 12 times per year (only part of municipality): value = 3
- less than 12 times per year (for the whole municipality): value = 4
- 12 times per year (only for part of the municipality): value = 5
- 12 times per year (for the whole municipality): value = 6
- more than 12 times per year during a speciﬁc part of the year: value = 7
- between 12 and all times per year (for part of the municipality): value = 8
- between 12 and all times per year (for the whole municipality): value = 9
- all times per year: value = 10
SN Number of retail shops per municipality (divided by inhabitants)
SS Size of shops (employees per shop for retail)
EN Impact factor measuring sunday policy in surrounding municipalities
DE Population density (hectares per 1000 inhabitants)
HS Number of households (divided by inhabitants)
HD Number of households with double income (divided by inhabitants)
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AL Number of alderman (divided by total aldermen per municipality) for
- SGP - Orthodox protestants
- CU - Orthodox protestants
- CDA - Christian democrats
- SP - Socialistic Party
- PvdA - Social Democrats
- GL - Green left
- VVD - Conservative liberals
- D66 - Progressive liberals
IN Number of inhabitants per municipality (divided by 100,000)
CH Number of inhabitants that attend church services at least once per
week (divided by total inhabitants)
RE Dummy with value 1 if municipalities is part of province (12 provinces)
36
